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Aleutian Allusions

Mackenzie King’s Diary and the
Invasion of Kiska in 1943
Galen Roger Perras

I

n 1976 C.P. Stacey issued A Very Double Life:
The Private World of Mackenzie King. Based
on King’s recently-opened diaries, the book
startled many Canadians. Seen by many as a
dull man prone to bouts of meandering verbosity,
instead Canadians discovered the outwardly
drab King in fact had been “an inhabitant of
two worlds”: a careful statesman immersed in
the “very practical world of politics and public
affairs”; and a quixotic figure fascinated by the
occult, an embarrassing devotee to his mother,
and a possible procurer of prostitutes. The
diary, which begins in 1893 and ends in July
1950, as Stacey avers, is “the most important
single political document on twentieth-century
Canadian history.”1 But while many focus on the
diary’s more salacious details, this article will use
the diary to study King’s part in sending 5,000
Canadian soldiers to participate an American-led
assault upon the Japanese-held island of Kiska in
the Aleutian archipelago in August 1943. King’s
role is important for several reasons. First, as
J.L. Granatstein notes, King utterly dominated
his government, especially in the Second World
War when his Cabinet had no more than four or
five truly effective ministers amidst a “cabinet
table...surrounded by more than a few genuine
mediocrities, political hacks, and patronage
seekers.” Further, as a Liberal steeped in the
19th-century British tradition, King’s political
watchwords were caution, balance, pessimism,
and distrust of the military profession. As he
told a visiting British diplomat in May 1938, “his
experience of political life had taught him that any
success he had attained had been due far more
to avoiding action rather than taking action.”2

Unlike the European theatre of operations, where
hundreds of thousands of Canadian personnel
had been handed over to Allied control with
little real debate, King and his Cabinet War
Committee (CWC) enjoyed absolute discretion
employing Greenlight Force, the Canadian
brigade group sent to the Aleutians. Through
King’s diary we can follow, from inception to
conclusion, the political imperatives behind an
optional military operation. Ever keen to limit
Canada’s military liabilities, King only reluctantly
accepted a Kiska role for fear relations with the
United States would suffer if he had declined.
Understandably concerned about the quality
of military advice after catastrophic defeats at
Hong Kong in December 1941 and at Dieppe
in August 1942, the CWC severely restricted
the military’s freedom of action in establishing
Greenlight Force. Nevertheless, things did not go
as expected. After risking considerable political
capital, King gained little when 35,000 Allied
troops landed on Kiska only to find its Japanese
occupiers had covertly evacuated three weeks
before. Thus when Winston Churchill told King
in September 1944 Canada could secure a place
in future operations “along the Aleutian islands
and the Kuriles,” the Canadian leader acidly
rejoined he “did not wish our men assigned to
any second Kiska role.” If Canadian troops had
to fight in the Pacific, King wanted them to do
so in highly visible and important regions like
Formosa, Japan, and the Philippines.3
The roots of the Kiska operation lie in King’s
concern about home defence, a concern that
predated the Second World War. Though Stacey
has argued King’s martial disinterest was so
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Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King only reluctantly
accepted a role for Canada in the Kiska operation for
fear that relations with the United States would suffer if
he declined.

“recognize an obligation to coast defence, & to
the British Navy.” But after coming to power,
in the wake of the Anglo-Japanese alliance’s
replacement by multinational agreements
limiting Pacific naval armaments in 1922, Prime
Minister King cut the navy to just two destroyers.5

marked he “would have understood those Chinese
intellectuals, who, we are told, regard soldiers
as an inferior race whose proceedings deserve
only the contempt of civilized men,” recent
scholarship asserts King supported rearmament
after 1935 to protect Canada against American
encroachment in the event of a war between
Japan and the United States.4 Such concerns
had emerged early. When Wilfrid Laurier created
a Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in 1910 to deflect
demands for a Canadian contribution to the
Royal Navy, Minister of Labour King noted while
ships on the west coast “would be best from the
point of real efficiency to the Empire,” they would
“be unpopular in Quebec & the East.” Ten years
later when Admiral Viscount Jellicoe suggested
fielding 15 Canadian warships in the Pacific, as
opposition leader King thought Canada should

When King nervously attended his first imperial
conference in 1923, determined British attempts
to centralize the empire’s foreign and defence
policies made little headway. King greatly
distrusted imperialists, while his minority
government rested upon a shaky concord
between isolationist French Canadians and antimilitarist Progressives. Arguing Canada had
never brought the empire into a conflict and
likely would never do so given its geographical
isolation and good relations with America,
King won the hard-fought concession that each
Dominion’s primary military responsibility was
home defence despite vehement Australian
opposition.6 Even after gaining a firm majority in
1935, King told Parliament in 1936 with “respect
to all the great issues that come up,” Canada’s
first duty to the empire and the League of Nations
was “to keep this country united.” After 1937,
though King knew Canada would support Britain
against Germany, he would not commit lest an
emboldened British government would adopt a
hard anti-German line that instead might bring
on a conflict. When he approved rearmament in
1936–37, King was less interested in European
security than he was in safeguarding British
Columbia in the wake of Franklin Roosevelt’s
comments that America might intervene if
Canada could not rebuff Japanese aggression.7
In September 1939 King sought a war of limited
liability that emphasized air power and economic
production. But when Canada’s military pushed
for an expeditionary force for Europe, Under
Secretary of State for External Affairs O.D.
Skelton emphasized home defence, arguing “we
cannot in this war ignore the Pacific as we did
in the last.” General H.D.G. Crerar, Chief of the
General Staff (CGS), believed any diversion of
resources to the Pacific might lose the European
war. Intent on building a formidable Canadian
army that would play a major role in defeating
Germany, Crerar told Minister of National
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Defence J.L. Ralston in July 1940 the risk of
Japan attacking Canada was quite low. Further,
as Canada could rely on American intervention in
the event of Japanese aggression, it did not need
substantial home defence forces. King’s consent
in mid-August 1940 to Roosevelt’s suggestion of
a Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on
Defence (PJBD) to coordinate continental defence
only enhanced the drive to build a “big army” in
Britain now that Canada itself seemed secure.
As negotiations between America and Japan
ominously stalled in late 1941, Canada had just
six infantry battalions, 25 warplanes, and three
minesweepers in British Columbia.8
This did not mean that King was sanguine about
the strategic situation in the Pacific. In August
1940 he told Britain’s High Commissioner
that Canada might remain neutral in an AngloJapanese war so as not to injure Anglo-American
relations, adding ominously that Canada’s Pacific
coast was “wholly undefended.” Yet when he met
Japan’s Minister on 7 September, with no Britons
present, King took a harder line. After Baron
Tomei complained America’s possession of the
Philippines, Hawaii, and the Aleutian Islands
menaced Japan, King insisted Canadians were

“prepared to fight in any quarter of the globe
where the British Empire was threatened.”
Then in October, when invited to participate in
a Singapore-based conference about defence
cooperation in the south Pacific, against Skelton’s
desires King sent an observer though he agreed
with Skelton that Canada should not send military
forces to the region.9 Japan’s surprise December
1941 offensive changed much. Despite prompt
military assurances that British Columbia faced
only minor Japanese raids, cabinet minister
T.A. Crerar told journalist Grant Dexter on 8
December 1941 that King wanted two divisions
stationed in British Columbia. Crerar had not
exaggerated. Called from a Cabinet meeting on
9 December to receive word of the United States
Navy’s (USN) stunning losses at Pearl Harbor, a
shocked King worried that a Japanese assault
upon Canada’s west coast “seemed wholly
probable.” Desperate to prevent any diversion of
limited resources to home defence, on 10 and 11
December Canada’s chiefs of staff advised that
whilst recent Allied defeats had adversely altered
the Pacific’s strategic balance in favour of Japan,
Germany constituted the greatest long term
military threat and it remained “vitally important
to ensure that attention is not unduly diverted

LAC C 17287

Air Marshal Lloyd S. Breadner, Rear-Admiral Percy W. Nelles and Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, the Canadian
chiefs of staff, at the Quebec Conference. There was much friction between these senior officers and Prime Minister
King and his War Cabinet, over the decision to send Canadian troops to the Aleutians.
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from the Atlantic.” The army offered only 11
anti-aircraft guns for British Columbia, the RCAF
just 120 fighter planes; deploying anything more
to the west coast, army chief General Kenneth
Stuart argued, would play “into the hands of our
enemies.”10
Unconvinced by the military’s case, on 11
December King noted Japan might “make some
landing on our coast.” Still, even that dismal
possibility might work to his advantage as
Canadians might “not wish to see large numbers
of our men sent overseas in addition to those
already there before US troops begin to be landed
on either British or European soil.” But after
Singapore’s stunning capture in mid-February,
and with the Vancouver Sun demanding the flow
of Canadian soldiers to Europe should cease
while “the war moves towards Canada across
the Pacific,” King saw Canada’s generals as his
greatest immediate foe. He and Stuart argued
bitterly on 20 February about home defence and
the Pacific. Convinced that Canada’s military
saw nothing but the war in Europe, King fretted

Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s key advisors: Charles
G. Power, minister of National Defence for Air; James
L. Ralston, minister of National Defence; and Angus
Macdonald, minister of National Defence for Naval
Services.

Japan might take India, could knock China from
the war, and would attack Alaska and possibly
even British Columbia. Thus, while agreeing to
hold to the “basic view of defeating enemy in
Europe as immediate first step,” the CWC paid
more attention to Canadian defences. A week
later the prime minister, informing a sympathetic
Dexter and fellow journalist Bruce Hutchison
on 27 February that Japan soon would attack
Alaska and British Columbia, carped about army
ambitions and advised them “to keep banging
away at the generals” about home defence.
The increasingly bitter row finally abated in
mid-March when Stuart, claiming his job was
in jeopardy, created three new home defence
divisions.11
*****

I

n June 1942 the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
fell into an ambush at Midway Island and lost
four aircraft carriers. Japan’s sole success in
an overly complex scheme was its occupation
of the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian
chain. Midway’s results can be attributed in large
part to USN crypto-analysts having deciphered
IJN plans, but the mad scramble to meet the
Japanese threat revealed just how poorly
defended Alaska was. Uncertain whether the
army air force could reinforce Alaska in time to
meet the IJN onslaught, US Lieutenant General
John DeWitt of Western Defense Command,
which encompassed Alaska and the western
continental United States, asked Canada’s Pacific
Command to send two RCAF squadrons to
Yakutat near Anchorage within 24 hours. DeWitt
had good reason to expect assistance would be
forthcoming. The Canadian army had overturned
a September 1940 PJBD agreement that pledged
Canadian army, air force, and navy resources to
Alaskan defence on the grounds that “the political
need” for Canada to promise some measure of
assistance to America in the dark days of 1940
no longer applied in 1941. However, the final joint
plan ABC–22 of July 1941 committed the RCN
and RCAF to aid Alaska.12

On 27 April 1942 the PJBD had agreed to let
local commanders determine the distribution
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of west coast air strength. Moreover, Air ViceMarshal L.F. Stevenson, the RCAF’s commander
of Western Air Command, had begun planning to
transfer planes to Alaska as early as 5 May. But
the RCAF, which had objected to the PJBD’s April
decision because it seemed “to place upon Canada
the onus of providing re-enforcement [sic] in the
event on an attack upon Alaska,” had convinced
the CWC on 14 May to restrict warplane transfers
only to the Alaskan Panhandle. Therefore when
DeWitt’s request came, Minister of National
Defence for Air C.G. Power and his staff ruled
RCAF squadrons would only go to Annette Island
near the Panhandle’s southern frontier pending
a possible move to Yakutat.13 DeWitt appealed
Power’s decision. In temporary command in
British Columbia, Stuart advised standing firm.
For his part, Power told King the RCAF squadrons
should stay at Annette until the “situation
developed further and [the] purpose of reported
enemy concentrations more clearly indicated.”
Switching tactics, DeWitt called upon American
PJBD member General S.D. Embick to intervene.
Embick revealed the scope of Japan’s offensive
to General Maurice Pope, head of Canada’s Joint
Staff Mission in Washington DC. Though Pope
doubted the situation was so dire, he counselled

Embick to speak to Air Commodore H.V. Heakes.
Making pointed references to ABC–22, Embick
told Heakes the planes likely would be held
at Yakutat only until 8 June. Four hours later
Heakes cabled that the squadrons would be on
their way to Alaska shortly.14
The RCAF’s official history argues these
“complicated and occasionally irascible
negotiations” might have been avoided had
Canada been kept “fully in the intelligence
picture.” This greatly overstates the case.
Certainly America’s military had not revealed all
it knew about Japan’s intentions, but between
18 and 30 May it had sent Canada four major
messages outlining enemy plans. The problem
was not a shortage of timely information, only that
Canadian officers did not believe American threat
assessments. On 28 May, questioning American
steadiness and intelligence-gathering abilities,
Pope concurred with a British assertion that
the USN was overly anxious about the Pacific.15
Canada’s military confidently had expected
its new home defence emphasis would defeat
DeWitt’s request. But King declined to support
his military again. First, on 1 April Roosevelt
had indicated the Aleutians could be a vital land

LAC PA 183423

Prime Minister King (left) meets with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. Standing at the back are (l.-r.) General Henry Arnold, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal, General Sir Alan Brooke, Admiral Ernest King, General Sir John Dill, General George Marshall, Admiral
Sir Dudley Pound, Admiral William Leahy.
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bridge if the Soviets allowed American bombers
to use Siberian bases to attack Japan’s home
islands. But with American forces heavily engaged
elsewhere, Roosevelt had noted he “might have to
look to Canada for assistance in securing Alaska
and the Aleutians.” Then on 15 April, when
Roosevelt had accentuated Alaska’s vulnerability
to attack, King had replied he might be able to
send forces to Alaska “later on.” Moreover, undersecretary at the Department of External Affairs
(DEA) since Skelton’s death in January 1941, had
told King in March that not every allied nation had
to make its major military effort against Germany.
For Robertson, an active Canadian role in Alaska
might balance a politically worrying American
presence in Canada’s northwest on projects like
the Alaska Highway.16 Writing to a friend, King
argued that as Canada might require assistance
to defend British Columbia:
Not to be able to send planes and ships into
American territory, as for example Alaska, and
islands that lie beyond, is to risk much in the way
of additional co-operation by the United States in
the defence of our country, as well as their own,
and to convey to American citizens generally a
wholly erroneous impression, especially, where,
as of present, they are sending troops and ships
and men to the United Kingdom, to Australia,
New Zealand and India. This is a very serious
ground of misunder-standing to permit to
continue for any length of time.17

So, while Canadian officers sought to deflect
requests for air force assistance, King told his

Norman Robertson (left), the under-secretary of state for
external affairs, believed that a Canadian role in Alaska
might balance a politically worrying American presence
in Canada’s northwest on projects like the Alaska
Highway. J.L. Ralston, the minister of national defence,
also supported the Aleutians operation, but feared the
military would make committments to the US without his
full knowledge.

caucus on 27 May Canadian soldiers might be
needed in Alaska, adding three days later the
Japanese might “get a very considerable foothold
on parts of Alaska and even BC.”18 Upon hearing
of Japanese air raids upon the eastern Aleutian
base of Dutch Harbor on 3 June, though he
feared the Canadian public would “be in a state
of consternation over the Japanese being able
to establish bases in Alaska which would enable
them to attack our country and to prepare for
its invasion,” King felt great relief “to find how
completely the thing I have fought for all along
has been justified.” However, he also lambasted
Canadian military commanders:
As a matter of fact, our people have left Canada’s
position very much that of the position at
Singapore, basing their view on Hitler being the
only one to defeat and the security of outlying
parts. BC is pretty much today as Singapore.
We have been directing all our attention toward
fighting the battle on another front, and left the
back door completely opened for the enemy to
come in from that side.19

King’s gloom dissipated once Roosevelt told
him on 25 June that Japan’s occupation of the
western Aleutians was not as a preliminary step
towards a major assault upon North America, an
opinion also offered by British Field Marshal Sir
John Dill when he met with King in Ottawa on
12 July. So, as Japan consolidated its Aleutian
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King’s demand for full and timely disclosures
figured prominently when Aleutian operations

came up again in May 1943. American forces had
crept westward in the Aleutians, seizing islands
and building support bases for the eventual
recapture of Attu and Kiska. The American
services had engaged in often heated arguments
amongst themselves and with the British about
Pacific operational prospects. The argument
reached the boiling point when the Combined
Chiefs met at Casablanca in January 1943.
Convinced that his officers had overestimated
Japan’s military capabilities and that plans to
use the Aleutians to assault the Kurile Islands
might seriously delay the invasion of western
Europe, General George C. Marshall watered
down a proposal to retake the western Aleutians
as soon as possible in favour of “operations to
make the Aleutians as secure as possible.”21
Marshall’s restrictions and USN concerns about
the size of Alaska’s garrison was a major problem
for DeWitt. Though Alaska’s authorized garrison

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2007

foothold, by September 1942 Canadian planes
were raiding Kiska and Attu. In August 1942 the
RCN allocated five ships to the Aleutians, telling
naval minister Angus Macdonald only as the
vessels were about to sail. Though he released
the vessels, an indignant Macdonald limited
their tactical independence and informed a
disappointed USN no additional ships would be
forthcoming. Irate, King complained Canadian
officers had no right to make such commitments
without prior CWC permission. He did not object
to modest assistance for Alaska; indeed, on 4
September his government sent three small antiaircraft units to Alaska. What King wanted the
military to understand was that the CWC required
the full details of all operations “in which
Canadian assistance had been requested.”20
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Canadian soldiers from Le Régiment de Hull, a French-speaking unit, board US Navy transports bound for Kiska.

was 110,000 soldiers, many of the men were air
corps personnel and support troops tasked with
maintaining the overstretched communications
lines. Though the Joint Chiefs had said this
ceiling could be exceeded for approved offensive
operations, on 19 April 1943 they offered DeWitt
only two additional infantry regiments for action
in the Aleutians. Seeking more combat troops,
DeWitt told Major-General George Pearkes in
Vancouver on 19 April that Attu’s invasion was
imminent and that an operation against Kiska
was likely by summer’s end. Removed against
his will from a divisional command in Britain in
1942, Pearkes enthusiastically desired a role at
Kiska and offered an observer team for Attu.22

act in the Pacific. So when Pearkes reported
back on 25 May that DeWitt wanted either a
battalion-sized garrison force for the western
Aleutians or a brigade group ready by 1 August
for an amphibious landing, on the morning
of 26 May Stuart presented Ralston with five
reasons for accepting both suggestions: troops
would gain combat experience; army prestige
and morale would be enhanced; using home
defence conscripts in an active theatre would
lessen hostile public opinion towards the socalled “Zombies”; removing enemy forces from
American soil would improve relations with
Washington; and participation coincided with
PJBD continental defence plans.23

Stuart did not act until after Pope reported
that State Department official John Hickerson
had lobbied him on 8 May for a token Canadian
army role in the Aleutians. Hickerson’s judgment
“that such an invitation would be gratefully
accepted” was dead on. As the Canadian army’s
sole combat role since the December 1941 defeat
at Hong Kong had been the calamitous Dieppe
raid in August 1942, Stuart was now keen to

With no time for Ralston to digest the
subtleties of Stuart’s case, the minister and
the general rushed off to a CWC meeting where
Ralston, after a brief introduction, gave way so the
CGS could make his pitch. King said very little
about Stuart’s proposal during the CWC meeting,
but in his diary that night he was not so reticent.
King was quite displeased Ralston had not
brought the matter to the Cabinet table, especially
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as the CWC had once more warned the chiefs of
staff on 18 May about keeping the government
informed of all relevant military information in
a timely manner. Perhaps even more galling,
King and Stuart had met on 25 May to discuss
Canadian participation in the impending invasion
of Sicily, and the general had said nothing about
the Aleutians. Ever suspicious, King rightly
determined that Ralston had not known about
the Aleutian initiative, and feared Stuart had
initiated contact with DeWitt without Ralston’s
authorization or prior knowledge.24
Yet when the CWC reconvened the next day,
King’s anger had largely dissipated thanks to the
efforts of Norman Robertson. Still concerned
by the growing American presence in northwest
Canada and the political implications of that
presence, Robertson thought sending forces
to the Aleutians would deflect Australian
demands for a Canadian military role in the
south Pacific, enhance Canada’s standing in the
United States, and counter American activities
on Canadian soil. Frequently quoting from

Robertson’s carefully phrased memorandum,
King conditionally supported an Aleutian role
as long as it would not hinder attempts to
reinforce Canadian units in Britain. Anxious
that another military failure could damage his
government disproportionately while success
might bring far too little credit, and claiming no
knowledge of Anglo-American planning for the
Pacific theatre, the prime minister insisted that
final approval from the CWC would come only
after Roosevelt formally asked for Canadian
participation. When Power, whose son had been
captured at Hong Kong, thought the garrison
option sounded too dangerously like the British
request that had led to that embarrassing defeat,
Stuart quickly repeated that he had made no
prior commitments to the Americans. Appeased,
the CWC promised to grant consent only only if
Roosevelt or Secretary of War Henry Stimson
personally invited Canada to send troops to the
Aleutians. The matter was anything but settled.
Directed to extract the American invitation, Pope
complied but complained bitterly it would be
“more consonant with our self-interest to let the

LCMSDS Photograph Collection

Two Canadian soldiers, likely from the Winnipeg Grenadiers, prepare for the Kiska operation. It is interesting to note
the mix of Canadian and American gear used by the soldiers. Weapons (Lee-Enfield rifles, Bren Guns), battledress,
and ammunition pouches are of standard British-Canadian issue, while helmets, packs, rifle belts and canteens have
been drawn from US stores.
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This official Canadian Army Photo was
released to the press with the following
caption:
“Sleeping quarters are a bit cramped,
but these Canadian troops, bound for
high adventure in the Aleutians, take it
as all a part of the show as they await
the sailing of their transport vessel
northwards towards Kiska where
they are now in action against the
Japanese.”

Americans know that we wanted to play our part
in the expedition rather than to seek lamely the
‘cover’ of an invitation from them.” Stimson sent
the desired invitation on 29 May but insisted that
planning had to be handled through military, not
governmental, channels. The American army
also overcame USN objections that Canadian
participation was an obvious attempt to subvert
Alaska’s garrison ceiling lacking any apparent
“great political benefits.”25
King may have misled his advisers about his
knowledge of Allied planning for the war with
Japan. He had been present in Washington on 20
May when Roosevelt had discussed Attu (attacked
by American forces on 11 May) and had alluded
to a possible operation against Kiska. Indeed,
when queried by Roosevelt as to what he thought,

US National Archives 80-G-42784--USN 42784

LCMSDS Photograph Collection

King had welcomed “every
measure to evict the Japanese
from the Aleutian Area.” Perhaps
King had forgotten that meeting;
more likely he had chosen to
forget so as not to buttress
Stuart’s position, a position
King liked less and less after 27
May. On 28 May a livid Ralston
burst into King’s office to reveal
that some journalists had just
informed him Canadian troops
were already on Attu. Viewing
this as “an alarming development
in that it indicated that the army
are going ahead with operations
without the Cabinet having even
sanctioned them,” King heartily
approved Ralston’s decision to
call Stuart upon the carpet for
this distressing revelation. That
evening a browbeaten Stuart
explained there was only a
small team of observers on Attu,
calming King’s fears that the
army had covertly initiated a full-scale operation
without his knowledge. Stuart promised never
again to discuss military operations without
obtaining political approval, blamed Pearkes for
exceeding his instructions, and accepted King’s
demand that no further Aleutian troop transfers
would occur without prior Cabinet approval.26
By the next morning, as he pored through
communications about the bloody combat
ongoing at Attu, King entertained serious second
thoughts about sending Canadian soldiers to
the Aleutians. “Incensed that our forces should
have been drawn into this business without the
Minister of Defence or myself,” King mused that
he would have cancelled “the whole thing” had
the matter not already come to the attention of
the American army chief of staff, General George
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C. Marshall. To abort the initiative now could
engender serious problems with CanadianAmerican military cooperation in the Pacific
and might force Stuart’s resignation, no small
concern as the Quebec-born Stuart was the
rarest of Canadian generals, an officer opposed
to conscription for overseas service. Hopeful “the
whole business has been caught just in time,”
and believing that doing anything else “would
have made the situation worse,” King consoled
himself that Canadian participation in Aleutian
operations would be of “national value” as it
would prevent the United States from seeking
to take all the credit for safeguarding the North
American west coast.27
King’s acquiescence came at a steep price.
Stuart had dropped DeWitt’s garrison proposal
as administratively unworkable, but when
Ralston accepted Stimson’s Kiska invitation, he
insisted final approval of the actual despatch of
the Canadian brigade group, Greenlight Force,
would be “subject to the satisfactory completion”
of the military plans. Thus, the CWC instructed
a horrified Pope to obtain a copy of the formal
American directive authorizing Kiska’s invasion
so it could determine if the operation was likely to
succeed. Although the American Joint Chiefs let

Pope examine the document, they firmly declined
to release it to Ottawa unless the CWC promised
to severely restrict its circulation. This difficult
matter was resolved only when the CWC dropped
its demand to see the actual document after Pope
found the plan militarily acceptable.28
Pope was appalled by this tiresome “constant
hunting for cover” which he felt cast serious and
embarrassing doubts upon American military
abilities. Pope was mistaken. After Hong Kong
and Dieppe, the CWC was far more concerned
about Canadian military competence than any
perceived American martial inefficiency. As the
1942 Royal Commission that had studied the
Hong Kong debacle had noted 120 soldiers had
been despatched to that doomed colony without
adequate training, King’s government insisted
that all Kiska-bound soldiers had to have six
months training by 1 August 1943, later revised
to four months when Pearkes insisted a sixmonth rule would greatly impair the brigade’s
formation.29 Greenlight Force’s administrative
history admits one third of every brigade unit
had to be replaced thanks to an inadequate
army medical boarding system, an abundance of
over-age and inefficient officers, and the army’s
policy of treating home defence formations as

Canadian and US Forces land unopposed on Kiska, 16 August 1943. Hundreds of men and vehicles are visible at the
water’s edge, while lines of troops can be seen marching in single files up the draws leading from the beach.
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This grainy photo of the Canadian camp on Kiska captures the bleakness and desolation of the northern terrain.

reinforcement pools rather than as proper units
destined one day to see real combat. Le Régiment
de Hull, seven officers short when the process
began, lost 21 more including its commander
in the reorganization. Prior to 9 July the army
ordered Pearkes to confirm on three separate
occasions that the remaining men were fit for
combat. Despite all these efforts, when the
troops shipped out on 12 July, 26 insufficiently
trained men had to be left behind on the dock.
One disgruntled company from the Winnipeg
Grenadiers nearly mutinied, numerous men were
absent without leave, and some apprehended
deserters had to be put aboard their transports
at gunpoint.30
But the CWC would not authorize Greenlight’s
final move to Kiska until Major-General J.C.
Murchie had personally judged the brigade’s
readiness and deemed the tactical plan
acceptable. Murchie arrived on Adak Island on
6 August, but informed Ottawa all was well only
on the evening of 11 August, just hours before
the expedition’s departure for Kiska. Owing to
time zone differences and the need to decode
Murchie’s detailed message before Ottawa could
reply, Pearkes found himself in a most awkward
position on 12 August; some ships had already
left for Kiska and he still had no authorization
to let Greenlight go. Fortunately Ottawa’s
affirmative answer reached Pearkes before the
first Canadians were slated to depart.31 This
final problem left a bitter taste. Pope opined
that Murchie’s inspection had been a travesty.
Either Canada wanted to drive Japan from the
Aleutians or it did not; if it did then it should

have accepted American direction. Pearkes
complained the embarrassing delay had put him
in a “most unfair” position, though he admitted
later that he would have sent the troops without
authorization rather than risk the expedition to
Kiska.32 Certainly both generals had a point for
the CWC had put them in difficult positions, but
it is hard to sympathize with Pearkes as he had
secretly negotiated with DeWitt to force King to
accept a fait accompli. One doubts Ralston and
King thought they could derail a major military
endeavour at the very last moment, but that
possibility cannot be ruled out either. It certainly
was not one of Canada’s finer moments, and
clearly illustrated that Canadian civil-military
relations in 1943 were at a dangerously low ebb.
The actual mechanisms involved in the
difficult and complex task of forming Greenlight
Force, which included despatching Marine
Corps instructors to Pacific Command to
acquaint the Canadians with amphibious warfare
techniques, does not seemed to have concerned
King. His diary contains just one reference to
Greenlight’s training, when he mistakenly noted
on 3 July 1943 that 5,000 Canadian draftees
had already left British Columbia for further
instruction with American forces already present
in the Aleutians. Rather, apprehensive that
using draftees in combat for the first time might
“change considerably the emotional feeling in the
country and the situation in Parliament,” King
hoped he would be up to the job, emotionally
and physically, “to hold the country steady.”33 On
15 August, as the first Canadian and American
soldiers began splashing through the bone-
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chilling surf at Kiska, King was in Quebec City,
playing host to Franklin Roosevelt, Winston
Churchill, and the Anglo-American Combined
Chiefs of Staff. Excluded from the meetings of
real substance, King greeted news of the landings
“with intense interest” and desired to broadcast
the operation’s significance to the Canadian
people. While King, according to Pope, “wished
to go to bat” on 15 August, the American military
permitted no announcement until all landing
operations at Kiska had been completed, a
restriction not lifted until 20 August.34 The lack of
Japanese opposition was puzzling though. When
King met with Churchill on 16 August, the British
leader wondered (correctly) if the Japanese
garrison “had left the place.” Unable to imagine
that possibility, King believed the Japanese
troops, hiding in Kiska’s rocks and caves, “would
turn up later.” When Murchie briefed King on 17
August, the general reassured the Prime Minister
the splendidly conditioned Canadian soldiers on
Kiska “were the best equipped lot of men that
had taken part in this war anywhere,” and that
Americans officers had praised them for their
“skill, daring, courage and efficiency” during the
landing and subsequent march inland.35
Having risked considerable political capital
by sending home defence conscripts to their first

combat zone, King remained keen to make his
public announcement even though the USN made
clear on 20 August that, given the unopposed
landing and the heavy casualties from friendly fire
and Japanese booby-traps (four dead Canadians
and dozens of American fatalities), it had no wish
to publicize the operation. J.W. Pickersgill, one
of King’s advisers, also opposed issuing a public
statement, maintaining Canadians, expecting
to hear “the operation had been something of a
major character,” would “experience a sense of
keen disappointment” once they knew the more
prosaic truth. Pickersgill dropped his objection
when King countered they might never again
have an opportunity to show the extent to which
Canadian forces had cooperated with the United
States to protect Alaska. No doubt Pickersgill had
seen the power of King’s wisdom or at least the
wisdom of acknowledging King’s power! King’s
radio statement, made on of 21 August, outlined
the operation, mentioned the Canadian units
involved and their commanders, emphasized the
extensive training the brigade had undergone,
and stoutly defended his government’s record on
home defence and the conflict in the Pacific.36
While Stacey labels Kiska’s invasion a
“fiasco” and “a ridiculous anti-climax,” Pearkes
and Stuart hoped the operation would act

LCMSDS Photograph Collection

A Canadian soldier catches a quick catnap before boarding the transport which will take him to Kiska.
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as a springboard for even more ambitious
plans. On 31 May Stuart had initiated “Poppy,”
a study about employing Canadian troops
in the Aleutians, on mainland Asia, and in
the southwest Pacific. Furthermore, he had
demanded that the staff officers involved in the
planning should shun official communications
channels and the military’s official filing system,37
truly extraordinary measures that might indicate
Stuart was playing a dangerous game just days
after his dressing down by Ralston and King.
Pearkes was even more reckless. On 5 July,
after DeWitt had mentioned moving against the
Kuriles Islands in 1944, he and Pearkes had
promised to keep talking about Canada’s future
role in the Pacific. Murchie had cautioned Pearkes
that such plans were for the CWC to consider.
That warning had no effect. Days later Pearkes
stated Kiska was the “first step to Tokyo and that
Canada should be prepared to follow it up and
stay with it to the end,” and Greenlight would
“be the forerunner of larger expeditions from
Pacific Command.”38 By early August, envisaging
three Canadian brigades for the Kuriles, Pearkes
naively claimed that he had not the slightest
idea what King wanted, and planning had to
begin immediately. To speed up the process,
Pearkes had suggested wintering Greenlight in
the Aleutians, parcelling its units out later to
train the Kurile force.39 Intent on meeting those
desires, on 30 August Stuart asked the CWC to
retain three brigades in Pacific Command in case
the Pacific conflict unexpectedly deteriorated and
to serve as reinforcements pools for Europe. As
Greenlight’s fine performance at Kiska might
prompt Washington to ask Canada for further
assistance in the Pacific, unless the formation
was maintained the CGS pointed out it might
take eight months to reform disbanded units, a
delay that might prove most embarrassing.40
Stuart’s ideas had support. Just days
before Roosevelt had noted Germany’s ultimate
defeat would allow the Allies, including
Canada, to transfer more military resources
to the fight against Japan. Even the RCN,
focussed on its brutal battle with Germany, was
contemplating extensive Pacific operations so
that it might acquire cruisers, aircraft carriers,
and a prestigious blue water fleet status. 41
H.L. Keenleyside of the DEA also advocated a
wider Canadian role in the Pacific. A “northern
nationalist” who believed Canada’s future “lay
in the responsible development of the northern

frontier,” Keenleyside had been struck by the
sheer scale, intensity, and permanence of the
American effort in Canada’s northwest. Worried
46,000 static Canadian troops in the region
could not balance the more dynamic American
presence, Keenleyside wanted a visible part in
north Pacific operations to demonstrate Canada
deserved a real voice in determining a prostrate
Japan’s postwar future.42 King, however, was
in no mood to accept any more military advice.
When the CWC discussed potential participation
in Kurile operations on 8 September, King
dispensed with the army’s plans. Although
accepting the need to retain adequate reserves in
Pacific Command for unexpected eventualities,
King rebuked the military for seeking substantial
commitments when Canada was heavily engaged
in Europe. But after Ralston defended Stuart,
the ministers declined to make any decision.
When the matter came up again on 12 October,
King said little as Ralston and Stuart quarrelled
about Greenlight Force. Ralston suggested leaving
a small force behind in the Aleutians over the
winter to represent Canada’s continued interest
in the north Pacific, but Stuart pushed for the
entire brigade to be returned to Canada for
retraining for possible future operations. The
ministers agreed. As Power put it, the period
of active north Pacific operations was over and
all the soldiers should come home by January
1944.43
Canada’s mixed record of involvement in
Aleutian operations strongly influenced King’s
attitude towards the Pacific conflict until Japan’s
surrender in 1945. On 1 December the Canadian
leader noted in his diary that Roosevelt and
Churchill had gone too far by publicly announcing
Japan would be stripped of its colonies at the
war’s end. This declaration would leave Japan
little choice but to keep fighting, which might
mean Canada coming “into the war against Japan
on a larger scale than has been intended.” Just
over a month later, King and Power discussed
a possible Canadian contribution to the final
invasion of Japan. Power wanted to send 60
RCAF squadrons, but recalling Hong Kong and
the Aleutians, King worried most Canadians
would be unenthusiastic. Certain “there was
really no place for sending any army over the
Pacific” and that Canada would “get little credit
for anything” it might do from its allies, the
war-weary leader reluctantly accepted Canada’s
“obligation to share” in Japan’s defeat.44
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Determining the extent of Canada’s share
was not easy. Britain, which wanted Dominion
help to recover its lost Asian possessions, sought
indications such assistance might be forthcoming.
But taking exception to Lord Halifax’s public
advocation of a united imperial foreign policy
in Toronto in late January 1944, an irate King
ordered Power, Robertson, and Privy Council
clerk A.D.P. Heeney to draft a response. That
document, ready by 10 February and carefully
vetted by King, insisted Canada’s commitment
to the war with Japan would be determined by
its status as a Pacific nation, its Commonwealth
membership, a desire to defeat Japan, and its
“close friendship and common interest with the
United States.” As a northwestern route across
Canada to Japan might become important, it
might be “advisable for Canada to play her part
in the Japanese war in very close cooperation
with the United States, at any rate in certain
operational areas.” 45 Concerted British and
Australian efforts to alter King’s mind at a
meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in
London in May 1944 failed utterly. King was
surprised to discover the British had not been
able “to figure out just what was needed” to fight
Japan, the result of a bitter battle within Britain’s
Cabinet between advocates of a strong military
effort against Japan and those wanting to speedily
rebuild Britain’s battered civilian economy.
Declining to support Australian Prime Minister
John Curtin’s demands for improved imperial
consultative machinery for the Pacific war and
the postwar period, noting neither British nor
Canadian plans had been finalized, King refused
to sign a statement that the Commonwealth had
devised a common strategy to fight Germany and
Japan. Adding insult to injury, King declared that
as Canadian forces had been cooperating with
their American counterparts to secure the north
Pacific and the Aleutians, it “might be thought
wise in the strategy of war for us to continue in
that way and when attacking Japan.”46
In the end, King’s assertion held; despite the
strenuous efforts of the British, the RCAF, the
RCN, and some Cabinet ministers, most notably
navy minister Angus Macdonald, Canada opted
to fight in the northern Pacific and to attach
an army division to American forces slated to
invade Japan in 1945-46. Nor did King relax
his control over the process. When Roosevelt
suggested deploying Canadian troops to China
in March 1945, King indignantly complained

about the President proposing “anything of the
kind.” Then when the British asked Ottawa in
August 1945 to let the Canadian division serve
in an imperial corps with British and Australian
forces, the army, which had begun equipping its
troops with American weapons and adapting
them to American command systems, declined.
When Japan surrendered in mid-August, Canada
summarily rejected two British requests to
include Canadian units in the recapture of Hong
Kong and a Commonwealth occupation force for
Japan.47 Canada’s Pacific war was over.
King had never forgotten the Kiska episode,
though his recall of events altered with the
passage of time. In May 1943 his ire had been
directed, and properly so, at Stuart and Pearkes
for their unauthorized discussions with DeWitt.
Yet in a bitterly reflective moment on 16 January
1945, a tired prime minister asserted Canada
had often got into trouble over the course of the
war because of the overzealous conduct of some
officials in the Department of External Affairs and
the Department of National Defence. Certain “we
are getting a certain kind of bureaucracy working
out these things [policies] amongst themselves,”
King was amazed Robertson “does not see the
terrible import of anything of the kind.” In
particular, King blamed Keenleyside for having
got Canada “into the Kiska expedition business,”
though the diary offers no further explanation
for this harsh and mistaken judgement.48 In
fact, Keenleyside had not initiated the despatch
of Canadian troops to Kiska in the summer of
1943, though he had lobbied King in July 1943
to follow up the Kiska attack by participating
in more American-led operations in the north
Pacific. Certainly King knew he possessed the
capacity for making mistakes, as he made clear
on 1 January 1902:
This journal is strictly private, and none should
look upon its pages save with reverent eyes, and
a heart that can abide with silence, for its is the
story of a human life, its ambitions, its beliefs, its
failures & its broken achievements, all of which
may be right or wrong, none of which are without
their influence, and purpose for all time.49

King’s admission of the possibility of failure and
error links him to the rest of humanity, for as
J.M Barrie, Peter Pan’s creator, has commented,
the”life of every man is a diary in which he means
to write one story, and writes another; and his
humblest hour is when he compares the volume
19
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as it is with what he vowed to make it.”50 After
getting their chance to read King’s fascinating
diaries, Canadians might agree with Barrie.
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